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Abstract—Vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) is an emerging
type of networks to allow vehicles on roads to communicate for
driving safety. An vehicle can broadcast messages (e.g. accident
information) to other vehicles. These messages may have impact
on other vehicles as well as the traffic control system, so all
messages must be signed and authenticated. On the other hand,
privacy should be enforced while the real identity of the sender
should be traceable by authorized party. In this poster, we first
discuss the limitations of existing solutions. In particular, we
describe an impersonation attack to one of the schemes, highlight
the problem of communications overhead, and effectiveness of the
message verification procedure. Then, we present the main ideas
of our proposed scheme which can be shown to be secure and
more effective than existing schemes.
Index Terms—Secure vehicular sensor network, security, pri-
vacy
I. SETTING AND BASIC FUNCTIONS OF VANETS
A vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) is also known as a
vehicular sensor network by which driving safety is enhanced
through inter-vehicle communications or communications with
roadside infrastructure. It is an important element of the
Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSs) [1].
In a typical VANET, each vehicle is assumed to have an
on-board unit (OBU) and there are road-side units (RSU)
installed along the roads. A trusted authority (TA) and maybe
some other application servers are installed in the backend.
The OBUs and RSUs communicate using the Dedicated Short
Range Communications (DSRC) protocol [2] over the wireless
channel while the RSUs, TA, and the application servers
communicate using a secure fixed network (e.g. the Internet).
The basic function of an VANET is to allow arbitrary
vehicles to broadcast safety messages (e.g. road condition,
traffic accident information) to other nearby vehicles and RSU
such that other vehicles may adjust their travelling routes and
RSU may inform the traffic control center to adjust traffic
lights for avoiding possible traffic congestion.
II. SECURITY AND PRIVACY ISSUES
Like other communication networks, security issues have to
be well-addressed. In particular, a good scheme must satisfy
the following requirements:
1) Message integrity and authentication: A vehicle should
be able to verify that a message is indeed sent and signed
by another vehicle without being modified by anyone.
2) Identity privacy preserving: The real identity of a vehicle
should be kept anonymous from other vehicles and a
third-party should not be able to reveal a vehicle’s real
identity by analysing multiple messages sent by it.
3) Traceability: Although a vehicle’s real identity should be
hidden from other vehicles, if necessary, the TA should
have the ability to obtain a vehicle’s real identity.
III. PROBLEMS OF EXISTING SCHEMES
For authentication, digital signature in conventional public
key infrastructure (PKI) [3] is a well accepted approach. How-
ever, for VANETs, requiring a vehicle to verify the signatures
of other vehicles may not be practical. The computation power
of an OBU is not strong enough to handle all verifications in
a short time. Also, for messages from an unknown vehicle,
the public key certificate attached induces heavy message
overhead. So, a well-accepted alternative is to let the nearby
RSU to verify all messages.
Along this direction, [4] proposed the IBV protocol for
vehicle-to-RSU communications (it can be easily extended
for vehicle-to-vehicle communications). They also provided
a batch verification process to verify a large number of signa-
tures as a batch using three pairing [5] operations. However,
their protocol suffers from an impersonation attack which we
will explain in Section IV. Also, a vehicle’s real identity can
be traced by anyone, thus violating the privacy requirement.
On the other hand, in their batch verification scheme, if any of
the signatures in the batch is erroneous, the whole batch will
be dropped. This is inefficient because most signatures in the
batch may actually be valid and can be used, thus may imply
a not satisfactory success rate.
In [6], the RAISE protocol was proposed for vehicle-to-
vehicle communications. The protocol allows a vehicle to
verify the signature of another with the aid of a nearby RSU.
However, no batch verification can be done and the RSU has
to verify signatures one after another. To notify other vehicles
which messages are valid, hash values of individual messages
need to be broadcasted. As there can be tens up to thousands
of signatures within a short period of time, the notification
messages may induce a heavy message overhead.
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IV. IBV PROTOCOL AND IMPERSONATION ATTACK
In this section, we describe the IBV protocol and present an
impersonation attack (a vehicle can send messages on behalf
of another) to the protocol.
The IBV Protocol: Before network deployment, the TA sets
up the parameters using the following steps: 1) It chooses G
and GT that satisfy the bilinear map properties. 2) It randomly
picks s1, s2 ∈ Zq as its master keys. These two master keys are
preloaded into each vehicle’s tamper-proof hardware device.
3) It computes Ppub1 = s1P and Ppub2 = s2P as its public
keys. The parameters {G, GT, q, P , Ppub1 , Ppub2} are then
preloaded into all RSUs and OBUs. 4) It assigns each vehicle
a real identity RID ∈ G and a password PWD. The drivers
are informed about them during network deployment or during
vehicle first registration.
When a vehicle starts up, the driver first inputs its RID
and PWD into the tamper-proof device. If they are valid,
the tamper-proof device starts its role in generating pseudo
identities, secret keys and message signing. Vehicle Vi’s
pseudo identity is generated as IDi = (IDi1, IDi2) where
IDi1 = rP and IDi2 = RIDi ⊕ H(rPpub1) and r is a
per-session random nonce. Its secret key is then generated as
SKi = (SKi1, SKi2) where SKi1 = s1IDi1 and SKi2 =
s2H(IDi1||IDi2). Here H(.) is a MapToPoint hash function.
When vehicle Vi wants to send the message Mi, it generates
the signature σi = SKi1 + h(Mi)SKi2 where h(.) is a one-
way hash function such as SHA-1. Vi then broadcasts IDi,
Mi and σi to the RSU.
The RSU verifies the signature σi by checking whether
eˆ(σi, P ) = eˆ(IDi1, Ppub1)eˆ(h(Mi)H(IDi1||IDi2), Ppub2).
Having the pseudo identity IDi of vehicle Vi, the TA can
trace its real identity by using the TA RID Tracing Routine:
IDi2 ⊕ H(s1IDi1) = RIDi ⊕ H(rPpub1) ⊕ H(s1rP ) =
RIDi.
Impersonation Attack: Assume that at a certain instance,
vehicle Vi with real identity RIDi generates its pseudo
identity IDi = (IDi1, IDi2), secret keys SKi and signs
message Mi by generating the signature σi as usual. While Vi
is transmitting, an attacker Va records IDi. After some while,
Va generates the message Ma. It generates its pseudo identity
as IDa = (IDa1, IDa2) = IDi = (IDi1, IDi2) and its secret
keys as SKa = (SKa1, SKa2) where SKa1 = s1IDa1 =
s1IDi1 and SKa2 = s2H(IDa1||IDa2) = s2H(IDi1||IDi2).
It then signs the message Ma by generating the signature
σa = SKa1 + h(Ma)SKa2 and sends out IDa, Ma and σa
to the RSU.
Upon receiving Va’s message, the RSU can
verify it successfully because eˆ(σa, P ) =
eˆ(IDi1, Ppub1)eˆ(h(Ma)H(IDi1||IDi2), Ppub2). Assume
at a later time, Va’s message Ma causes an accident on the
road. The RSU forwards Va’s pseudo identity IDa as shown
in its message to the TA and wants to reveal its real identity.
After computing IDa2⊕H(s1IDa1) = IDi2⊕H(s1IDi1) =
RIDi ⊕ H(rPpub1) ⊕ H(s1rP ) = RIDi, both the RSU
and the TA think that Ma is being sent by Vi because Vi’s
instead of Va’s identity is traced. Thus Va can escape from
and pass its guilty of causing the accident to Vi. In fact, the
protocol also suffers from a few other security problems such
as privacy violation as any other vehicle can reveal the real
identity of others.
V. OUR PROPOSED SCHEME
Due to space limitation, we only list the core ideas in our
scheme. For details, please refer to [7]. Our scheme is also
based on bilinear map.
Provision of security and privacy: The use of pseudo identity
can help to hide the sender’s real identity, thus protecting the
privacy of the sender. The drawback of IBV protocol is that the
pseudo identity is linked to the real identity and is supposed
to be generated by the real signer. However, once the pseudo
identity is known, every vehicle can produce a corresponding
valid signing key. Thus, the attack is successful.
To resolve this problem, we propose to use a shared secret
mi between the vehicle and the RSU while keeping the idea
of using pseudo identity to protect privacy. So, the pseudo
identity is still generated based on the real identity. But then,
the signing key has to be generated based on the shared secret
mi, thus even if the attacker can get hold of the pseudo identity
of a vehicle, there is no way for the attacker to generate a valid
signing key to sign a message.
We show the basic scheme as follows. A vehicle Vi first au-
thenticate itself based on its real identity RIDi and password
PWDi using the conventional public key infrastructure to the
TA via the closest RSU. TA authenticates Vi and generates
the shared secret mi for RSU and Vi. TA securely forwards
mi, H(RIDi) and an encrypted block containing mi and s
(the system secret) for Vi to RSU. H(.) is a MapToPoint hash
function and the encrypted block can only be decrypted by Vi.
RSU, in turn, passes that encrypted block to Vi. This basically
completes the handshaking. A new shared secret between RSU
and Vi will be generated when Vi meets a new RSU.
To sign a message Mi, Vi first generates a random nonce
r and creates its pseudo identity IDi as (IDi1, IDi2) =
(rPpub,H(RIDi) ⊕ H(miIDi1)). The signing key SKi is
(SKi1, SKi2) = (smiIDi1, sH(IDi2)). It then generates the
signature as σi = SKi1+h(Mi)SKi2 where h(.) is a one-way
hash function such as SHA-1. Since mi is known by Vi, RSU
and TA only, no other vehicle can impersonate Vi. Note that
to avoid other attacks and allow efficient batch verification of
signatures, we need to enhance this basic scheme using another
shared secret between the TA and a vehicle. The details can
be found in [7].
Batch verification by RSU: To batch-verify the signatures, we
rely on the property that eˆ(
∑n
i=1 σi, P ) = eˆ(
∑n
i=1 miIDi1+
h(Mi)H(IDi2), Ppub). Compared to the batch verification
process proposed by the IBV protocol, ours uses one fewer
pairing operation. Recall that in IBV protocol, the whole batch
will be dropped if there is an invalid signature. To avoid this,
we adopt binary search to extract valid signatures. We divide a
batch into two halves and then perform checking on each half.
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If the half still contains invalid signatures, repeat the process,
otherwise notifies all signatures in the half. The searching
process stops when a pre-defined level of binary search is
reached or all valid ones are found.
Efficient notification by RSU: After the RSU verifies vehicle
Vi’s signature σi, it notifies all vehicles within its range the
result. Instead of including the hash value of each message in
the notification message, we store the hash values in bloom
filters (Please refer to [8] about what a bloom filter is).
If vehicle Vi wants to know if a message it received is
valid or not, it first computes the hash value of the message
and checks if the hash value is in the bloom filter (signed
by RSU). However, bloom filter is well-known to have false
positives. To resolve this problem, we use two bloom filters
with the additional bloom filter (negative filter, the other filter
is referred as positive filter) for storing the hash values of those
invalid signatures. In other words, if the hash value of the
message is found in the positive filter, but not in the negative
filter, we are sure that the message is valid. On the other hand,
if the hash value is found in the negative filter, but not the
positive filter, we are sure that the message is invalid. For the
other unresolved cases, we use a a reconfirmation procedure
to check the validity of the message. Based on our simulation,
the number of these cases is very few as long as the parameters
for the bloom filters (with respect to the number of hash values
to be stored in the filter) are set appropriately.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
We assume that vehicles passes through an RSU (in high-
way) at speeds varying from 50 km/h to 70 km/h. The RVC
and the IVC ranges are set to 600m and 300m respectively.
Inter-vehicle messages are sent every 500 ms from each
vehicle. IEEE 802.11a is used to simulate the medium access
control layer. The bandwidth of the channel is 6 Mb/s and
the average length of inter-vehicle message is 200 bytes. We
compute the transmission time based on the bandwidth and the
length of the message. The RSU performs batch verification
every 300 ms and each pairing operation takes 4.5 ms. We
implement the simulation using C++ language.
The simulation runs for 1000 s. We vary the inter-vehicle
message signature error rate from 1% to 10% to interpret
its impact on the performance of our schemes. For each
configuration, we compute the average of 5 different random
scenario. To measure the successful rate, we only consider
the batch with invalid signatures (invalid batch). We extend
the definition of the successful rate (only on invalid batches)
in [6] as IBSR = 1N
∑N
i=1
Miapp
Mimac
, where M iapp is the total
number of messages that are successfully verfied by the RSU
and are consumed by vehicle Vi in the application layer before
Vi leaves RSU’s RVC range.
The success rate and delay performance of our scheme are
shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2 respectively. In the figures,
SPECS (BS0) is our scheme without using binary search in
batch verification while SPECS (BS2) is our scheme using 2
levels of binary search in batch verification. It can be seen that
with binary search, a large portion of valid signatures in invalid
batches can still be used while the delay overhead induced is
only marginal. Note that in Figure 1, the success rate of IBV
and SPECS(BS0) are the same as both will drop the whole
batch if there is an invalid signature inside. In Figure 2, we
remark that our SPECS(BS0) is slightly better than IBV as
we improve the batch verification process by using one fewer
pairing operation.
Fig. 1. Invalid Batch Success Rate vs. Error Rate
Fig. 2. Delay vs. Error Rate
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this poster, we discuss the security and privacy concerns
for vehicle-to-vehicle communications in VANETs. We high-
light the problems of existing solutions and present the core
ideas of our proposed scheme. We show that our scheme is
more effective than existing schemes based on simulation. The
security analysis of our scheme is given in the full paper.
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